New European separatists want money, not national self-determination
And in September, Scottish independence fighters suffered a defeat, failing to convince the region's residents to vote for a divorce from London. However, this does not mean that the topic of separatism in Europe is closed. The EU has plenty of regions claiming the status of a separate state. Moreover, unlike in the past, the arguments of separatists are not nationalistic but primarily economic in nature.
At least since World War II, it was believed that the problem of borders and national self-determination in Western Europe was more or less resolved. Several hotbeds of tension continued to smolder – Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and Corsica. But by the beginning of the 21st century, these conflicts, if not finally resolved, had clearly lost their edge.
It is indicative that none of the territories where armed nationalist movements operated at the end of the last century appear today on the list of hotbeds of European separatism. Groups that for many years waged armed struggle for the liberation of national minorities have one by one abandoned terrorist activities, preferring legal work. Irish republicans successfully sit in the Northern Ireland Assembly and hardly ever mention the demand for independence. In the Basque Country and Corsica, nationalist militant groups have declared ceasefires. However, both movements have been largely crushed and, in fact, have admitted defeat.
Meanwhile, a completely different kind of separatism is coming to the fore. Not at all associated with radical protest, its proponents put forward primarily economic arguments and find supporters not among oppressed national minorities, but among the middle class.
The leaders of new separatist organizations are not at all like underground rebels hiding from the police in forests and basements. On the contrary, they head regional administrations, manage multi-million budgets, sit in parliaments, and hold meetings with 'captains of industry' dedicated to the investment attractiveness of the territory under their control. These movements are not national in principle, even if they sometimes use nationalist rhetoric. Their main idea is the protection of regional interests, and primarily financial interests.
The hotbeds of new separatism are Scotland, Catalonia, Northern Italy, and Flanders. While previous nationalist movements represented relatively poor and backward territories (explaining these problems by national oppression), today we are talking precisely about the most developed and wealthy regions seeking to secede from less successful neighbors.
Of course, each case has its own features. For example, Scottish nationalists yearn for an independent kingdom that existed two hundred years ago and recall its conflicts with England. However, these bygone matters have little in common with the demands of modern separatists, who significantly strengthened their position only after oil extraction began in the north of Great Britain.
As part of the British Empire, Scotland was not an oppressed or backward territory, but on the contrary, it was in a privileged position. Scots held a disproportionately large number of positions in the bureaucracy and army of the United Kingdom, and Glasgow, the business capital of the region, flourished in the 19th century, becoming the second most important city of the empire. Today, Scotland has not only substantial hydrocarbon reserves but also a more developed industry than England.
On the other hand, for most of the last century, Flanders lagged behind the French-speaking territories of Belgium in terms of living standards and industrial development. Throughout this time, there was no talk of dividing the country. But by the end of the 20th century, the socio-economic balance began to change rapidly. Metallurgy and other industries that had been the pride of Belgian industry in the past began to decline. Conversely, new industries developed in Flanders that were not affected by the restructuring of the global economy and subsequent crises. As a result, while Flanders previously received support from the central budget, now it itself has to contribute more to the common treasury than it receives from it.
Even more illustrative is the history of Northern Italy. After all, it was these territories that played a decisive role in the unification of the country; a new pan-Italian identity was formed here and spread from here (incidentally, the idea of 'Britishness' was also born not in England, but in Scotland). The first capital of a united Italy was Turin – now, along with Venice, one of the centers of northern separatism. Throughout Italy's history, the northern regions have dominated the south economically, culturally, and ideologically, and this state of affairs has persisted to the present day.
A somewhat more complex picture emerges when looking at the history of Catalonia. On the one hand, this part of Spain has always been the richest and most developed. On the other hand, the people of Catalonia regularly complained of oppression by Madrid, repeatedly rebelled, and fell victim to repressions.
However, an important caveat must be made. Within the framework of modern nationalist discourse, any conflicts between regional elites and the center, as well as any social protests that took place in a given territory, are automatically classified as national liberation struggle, although the participants themselves would probably be very surprised to learn of such an interpretation.
One way or another, the conflict between Barcelona and Madrid has existed for almost the entire history of Spain, intensifying at times of political crises, revolutions and civil wars. In the 17th century, the Barcelona nobility and part of the bourgeoisie oriented toward France, hoping to defend their liberties and privileges from the Habsburgs ruling in Madrid. During the War of the Spanish Succession, on the contrary, Barcelona supported the Habsburgs against the French Bourbons. Suffering defeat after defeat in these conflicts, Catalonia gradually lost its special status in the Spanish monarchy, until it degraded to the status of an ordinary province.
During the civil war, industrially developed Barcelona became a stronghold of the Republicans – for social rather than national reasons: it was here that a significant part of the working class was concentrated, oriented toward socialists, anarchists and even Trotskyists. For its part, the victorious regime of Generalissimo Franco punished the disloyal territory with a new wave of repression, hitting not only local self-government but also local cultural institutions. The Catalan language (specifically language, not dialect, and specifically Catalan, not Catalonian) was effectively banned. Although by the end of the Franco era these restrictions were first eased and then lifted, the Catalan intelligentsia remembered well how it had been treated by the federal center.
Thus one could call Catalonia's claims against Madrid quite justified, if not for one 'but'. All these hardships were more than compensated for after the restoration of the monarchy in Spain. Catalonia received the broadest autonomy, such as is usually enjoyed by regions within the most free federation. The Catalan language, education and culture not only received equal rights with Spanish, but also gained priority.
Now in Barcelona, without knowledge of the 'national language', it is hardly possible to get a job even as a janitor in a state institution. Financial resources are directed to stimulate book publishing and cultural projects in Catalan. Moreover, a significant part of the funds comes directly from the central budget.
Read the continuation of the article:
SEPARATISM EUROPEAN STYLE (part 2)
Boris KAGARLITSKY,
director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements.