The peninsula has become a symbol of a war of ideologies
Against the backdrop of the decision by Russian authorities to annex the peninsula as quickly as possible, natural questions arise. Why, for example, did we not annex Abkhazia and South Ossetia, did not respond to the referendum in Transnistria, which was also actively seeking to join Russia? After all, we will in any case support Crimea and maintain a military presence there, just as we support and maintain it in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
If nothing particularly changes whether Crimea becomes a republic within the Russian Federation or a non-state entity like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, why insist precisely on annexing Crimea, blowing up international law norms, giving grounds for US and EU sanctions?
And at the same time depriving ourselves of propaganda caveats about Western actions in Kosovo – after all, neither the US nor any EU country annexed that territory.
The answer to these questions lies in the very logic of the development of Russian foreign policy, perceptions of the world and Russia's place in it. For all the similarity of the two campaigns: "peace enforcement" in Georgia in 2008 and the actions of "little green men" on Ukrainian territory in 2014 – they have fundamental differences.
The war with Georgia took place at the peak of an economic upturn – modest, but clearly a record for the current Russian authorities. At that time, there were at least formal grounds for sending in troops – Georgian shelling of Russian peacekeepers, even if on Georgian territory, which South Ossetia still is from the point of view of the international community. Moreover, most residents of South Ossetia had Russian passports by that time.
Nothing of the sort exists in Crimea. This military campaign is taking place against the backdrop of an economic downturn in Russia that is now irreversible under the current government. We are annexing Crimea in part because no one except us (two obscure islands and Venezuela, in this case, don't count) has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and they are unlikely to recognize them in the foreseeable future. Now we are showing that we are ready to go as far as necessary and fear nothing. That Russia is not a "junior partner of the West" and not just a participant in establishing the world order, but an independent geopolitical player. Another question is whether there are objective grounds for such decisiveness on the part of Russian authorities. Recent history will show that very quickly.
We officially are not afraid of Western sanctions. As the fiery speaker of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko says: if they ban us from traveling around the world, we will vacation in Sochi. In the new Kremlin logic, such sanctions are even a plus.
After all, we have now officially become enemies of the West (in 2008 there had not been such a final break – for this Russian government). Therefore, any countermeasures by the US and EU, in the view of the Russian authorities, should unite the people even more closely in the face of inevitable economic hardships.
Russia had no ideology for a long time. Now it does. Conservative neo-imperialism. Crimea has become a symbol of Russia's consolidation against the hated West, onto which we will now with redoubled energy begin to blame our own inevitable economic failures.
When critics of Kremlin policy on Crimea and Ukraine say that we are taking the shortest path to finally turning into a pariah state, to neo-isolationism, for the Russian authorities, this seems to be only additional confirmation of their rightness. Our propaganda for many years with increasing intensity instilled in society that the West is an enemy seeking to weaken Russia. That Russia is in a besieged fortress. And now, it seems, the government itself has believed it, trying to turn the discourse of Russia as a besieged fortress into reality.
This pariah status is exactly what our government considers heroism, a manifestation of the truly independent policy of a power that has risen from its knees and no longer needs to "flirt" with the West.
In this sense, it is important for both Russians and the international community to understand that no West, no sanctions, no accounts of Russian officials in Western banks, and no real estate in Europe or Miami will stop the Russian authorities. Only they can stop themselves. For now, with Crimea at the ready, we are rising from our knees, straightening to full height, and the world does not know what our next step will be. Do we ourselves know?
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