Of the three main options for deciding the fate of the peninsula – annexation to Russia, a quasi-independent state like South Ossetia, and remaining part of Ukraine under a confederation based on the 1992 constitution – only the last is relatively beneficial for Russia.
In any case, Crimea will end up being supported by Russian taxpayers. But the degree of responsibility and the depth of political consequences for Russia are very different.
On March 6, the Crimean parliament decided to join the autonomy to Russia and made a corresponding request to the Russian leadership. At the same time, lawmakers postponed the referendum on the status of the peninsula for a third time: first the plebiscite was scheduled for May 25 together with the snap presidential election in Ukraine, then for March 30, now for March 16.
Two questions will be put to the referendum: 1) Are you for the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation? 2) Are you for the restoration of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and for Crimea's status as part of Ukraine?
Vladimir Putin immediately held a meeting of the Russian Security Council on the situation in Crimea, but gave no response to the Crimean parliament's decision. After that, Russian and Crimean authorities 'gave conflicting accounts' regarding the sequence of further actions.
The Crimean parliament decided on the autonomy's accession to Russia in the expectation that Russia would carry out the appropriate procedures, said Vladimir Konstantinov, speaker of the Supreme Council of the autonomous republic. 'If they decide to start the procedure, then we will consider this issue at the referendum,' Konstantinov said.
That is, the Crimean lawmakers decided to get an answer from Russia before the expression of will by Crimeans themselves, in order to give the first referendum question more weight. However, the Russian authorities apparently decided to observe formal decency and leave themselves at least some room for diplomatic maneuvers. According to Leonid Slutsky, head of the State Duma committee on CIS affairs, the Duma will consider the issue of a simplified procedure for joining Russia for new territories after the referendum on the status of Crimea takes place in Ukraine.
After all, South Ossetia also asked to join Russia even before the war with Georgia, but it was not accepted. And after the war, Russia did not annex that territory either, only recognizing it as an independent state. At the same time, from a financial point of view, the situation has not fundamentally changed: Russia both supported and continues to support South Ossetia effectively as its own region. And there is no chance for its independent development yet.
The Crimean parliament, naturally trying to 'strike while the iron is hot,' put Putin before an extremely unpleasant choice. If on March 16 Crimea votes for joining the Russian Federation and Russia agrees to it, a full-fledged 'Cold War' awaits us.
Ukraine and Georgia will very likely end up in NATO. This will be the end of all integration projects in the CIS, since Russia for the first time in post-Soviet history will take someone else's territory – after all, Crimea had no intention of joining Russia before the introduction of Russian troops there. Now certainly no country in the post-Soviet space will be able to feel at ease in relations with Moscow and will seek more reliable allies capable of guaranteeing the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics.
These are new huge financial obligations for an already ailing Russian economy. These are inevitable sanctions that will affect not only officials but also ordinary Russians. This is an inevitable deterioration in the lives of Russian citizens. This is the final transformation of Russia into a country that cannot be a mediator in resolving local international conflicts – it will simply no longer be trusted.
Russia could strongly advise Crimea to vote for expanded autonomy within Ukraine (ideally, it should have waited for the election of Ukrainian authorities and ensured that it is the new legitimate Ukrainian government that restores broad autonomy rights to Crimea).
But Putin may perceive this as weakness. After all, the only point of the war with Ukraine in the minds of those Russians who support it is precisely the return of Crimea.
The third option is Crimea's actual exit from subordination to Ukraine and transformation into a formally independent state. For Russia, it differs little from annexing the territory. No one in the world except Russia and a couple of other countries will recognize such a state.
Moreover, Russia will have to support Crimea in any case. And the Crimean authorities are already expressing full readiness to 'ride on the neck.' Crimea is ready to accept the Russian ruble as its national currency as part of the plan to join the Russian Federation, said First Vice-Premier of Crimea Rustam Temirgaliev. He also stated that 'all Ukrainian state enterprises will be nationalized and become property of the Crimean autonomy.' It is unlikely that anyone other than Russia will do business with these confiscated enterprises.
Tactically, Russian society may take this as a great victory for Russia and President Putin personally. But given the trends in the Russian economy and the political consequences of such a decision, very soon we will inevitably feel how expensive imperial ambitions are for citizens when not backed by corresponding economic capabilities.
In fact, Russia is moving along a trajectory that led to the collapse of the USSR, when economic ruin made it impossible for the central government to maintain control over such gigantic territories.
Instead of establishing new mechanisms of world order together with Western countries, Russia may end up a pariah state with hopeless (until a radical change in foreign and domestic policy) economic prospects. And we simply do not have enough money to make Crimea live fundamentally better than as part of Ukraine.
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