The number of Russians who 'definitely do not want' to move abroad permanently reached a seven-year high in 2018
According to RFI, these are the results of the latest survey on 'Emigration Sentiments' of Russians, published on February 4 by the Yuri Levada Analytical Center. These sentiments were commented on by Natalia Zorkaya, head of the Department of Socio-Political Research at the Levada Center.
– In December last year, 61% of respondents answered 'definitely no' to the question about wanting to move abroad. That is 5% more than in 2017. Since 2011, the number of those who so firmly ruled out the possibility of leaving has almost never exceeded half. What is behind this increase in those 'decided' with a negative answer on emigration? It would seem that economic stagnation, falling incomes, and unclear prospects should lead to a rise in 'packed suitcase' sentiments.
– Packed suitcase sentiments serve more as a barometer. Our survey does not indicate a real readiness to emigrate, but rather fluctuations in the moods of people who do not like the life they lead. Whether in the capital, large cities, peripheral towns, or villages. The increased indicator of unwillingness to go anywhere (80% – if we add the 'definitely no' and 'rather no' answers) corresponds to the share of people who lead a 'semi-serf' lifestyle. After all, according to our data, only 20-25% of the population have foreign passports. The majority of people generally live not very mobile lives. Moreover, it seems to me that the fact that the country has been living in an increasing sense of isolation from the rest of the world has played a role here. This is being instilled by propaganda, and the feeling of isolation is growing.
True, the mobilization boost in support for the authorities that emerged after Crimea is declining, and dissatisfaction with everyday life, with the internal life of the country, is growing. The situation in this sense is changing. But emigration sentiments usually affect the most independent, active, young, educated, and qualified part of the population, those who have the resources to even think about emigration. Since 2014, there has been a real 'brain drain' in this very thin layer. I don't have exact statistics at hand, but certainly hundreds of thousands were leaving annually. Although we are talking about a very thin urban 'self-made' layer that has the opportunities and prospects to establish themselves in the West.
The rise in 'packed suitcase' sentiments always exceeds actual emigration: if 15% say they want to leave, then when answering clarifying questions – 'what are you doing about it and what are your specific plans' – it turns out that only about 2% are actually doing something about it.
Answers about readiness to emigrate are more an indicator of rejection of the political, social, and economic reality and a desire for some other imaginary life, rather than a real desire or ability to emigrate.
– Readiness to emigrate is most pronounced among young people: 41% of respondents aged 18-24 answer 'definitely yes' or 'rather yes' to the question about wanting to move abroad. That is twice the overall sample rate (17%). How long have you been recording such sentiments among young Russians?
– Among young people, such an indicator was also present in 2006 and 2010 – around 40%. True, the same pattern applies. Young people more often want to go study or work, and in reality, very few actually leave. Among active and educated urban youth, these sentiments are stronger.
We have also conducted studies in which we modeled the still-unformed middle class in Russia – by selecting respondents with high per capita income, residents of the largest cities, limiting respondents by age (up to 40), and educational level (one or two higher education degrees, academic degree). In this environment, the indicator (readiness to emigrate – RFI) in the largest cities reached 40-45%. Especially on the eve of the 2011 protests, which in a sense were an outburst of emigration sentiments.
The main push factors (or, conversely, pull factors) for emigration were social or legal security, the desire to ensure normal living conditions for themselves, their families, and above all, their children. This layer – the 'proto-middle' class, which makes up no more than 5-7% of the population – has more opportunities to leave, and of course, there is a 'washout' from it.
Among young people, who are still sorting through different plans in their lives, the idea of leaving has been more pronounced for many years, throughout the entire Putin period. Especially if they are politically active and opposition-minded.
– How strongly do the absence of real political life in Russia in the Western sense and legal insecurity currently influence emigration sentiments? You ask your respondents clarifying questions about their readiness or unwillingness to participate in politics and whether they feel protected by the law.
– The majority of the population has adapted to state arbitrariness and insecurity, although they are dissatisfied with it. The share of people who feel protected by the law is growing, but still amounts to about 40%. The bulk of the population lives with a sense of insecurity of their rights, the inability to make long-term plans, and lives with anxious expectations of the worst. But these are people who do not have the opportunity to go anywhere. They adapt to reality by giving up their rights and any actions. The number of people who are ready and would like to participate more actively in public and political life does not exceed one-fifth of the population. This is the active part of the population – 20% – which is more likely to think about emigration.
– 20% of respondents have relatives or acquaintances who have emigrated in the last 2-3 years. How contagious is someone else's example, and for which categories of respondents?
– We conducted a whole study on emigration. I think that examples are more contagious, again, for the advanced, relatively well-off urban environment that has high incomes, high qualifications, and resources for retraining. It has connections abroad – friendly, familial, and even business. But between this environment and the rest of the population (the same conditional budget workers, residents of the periphery, etc.) there is a very large gap. This is a gap between successful city dwellers who protested in 2011 and the bulk of people who are now showing discontent in local protest actions but cannot unite, since there are neither real parties nor serious social movements that would help the apolitical part of the population formulate their demands and interests and move into action.
Therefore, examples of those who have already emigrated, if they work, work in the proto-middle class and, so to speak, in the pro-democratic and pro-liberal environment, which, by the most extreme estimates, does not exceed 30% of the population.
– How do Russians perceive “those leaving”? In general, according to your sample, a third have a positive attitude towards emigrants, the majority (56%) are neutral, and only 14% are negative. Among young people, a positive attitude prevails (45%). Has this attitude changed over the years of surveys? Are Soviet clichés about those who left as “traitors to the motherland” completely outlived?
– Unfortunately, we did not ask such a question before; we will need to repeat it. But it seems to me that it is too early to talk about the outliving of Soviet clichés. In what is hidden under the answer “neutral,” a large part consists of repressed negative feelings that people do not want to express openly and clearly negatively. In this neutrality there is both envy, resentment, and discontent. Such an answer does not only mean that people are free to act as they wish. I think that the attitude towards those leaving has such envious, resentful features. But this still needs to be verified.
Soviet clichés seem not to come to the surface, although now from deputies and public figures you can hear this phrase: if you don't like it here, pack your bags – and goodbye. This is a response to those dissatisfied and those who criticize the authorities: well, then leave. So the Soviet cliché persists.