This hope was fueled by the fact that there seemed to be nothing left to fall apart – everyone who could and wanted to had already separated. But reality is far more complicated than our perceptions of it: in recent months, a couple of very unusual examples of separatism have been presented by calm and prosperous Western Europe. Strangely enough, ideas of independence for everyone from everyone continue to grip the continent, and there are probably no simple explanations for this phenomenon.
The Disappearing British People
In late November last year, the results of a highly scandalous opinion poll conducted by ICM were published in the UK. The British were asked whether they wanted the United Kingdom to break apart, for example into England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It turned out that a majority of the country's population would readily accept such a split. For instance, in Scotland, 52% of respondents voted for the independence of their own country, with only 35% strongly against. Even more shocking were the results from the 'metropolis': 59% of residents of England supported the separation of their northern neighbors.
This poll spoiled a big celebration for Britain: in January 2007, the country was planning to solemnly mark the 300th anniversary of the local 'Pereyaslav Rada' – the unification of two states under the authority of the English crown. However, after public opinion expressed its indifference to the existing union, the celebrations had to be scaled back. For example, they decided against issuing a commemorative stamp series, and British cabinet ministers tried not to overemphasize the anniversary.
However, this story could have gradually faded into the past and been forgotten. After all, a poll is not a referendum; it has no legislative force. In addition, there is currently no powerful social movement in Britain ready to champion a slogan like 'For our and your freedom from each other!' The leading political parties simply do not include issues of regional separatism in their platforms. But last week, public opinion again behaved not too tactfully toward the United Kingdom.
Another sociological poll showed that the number of people who feel British is gradually decreasing. In 1996, just over half – 52% – associated themselves with Britain, now only 44%. The number of people who remember their 'small homeland' – the English, Scots, Welsh – is increasing. Particularly striking was that the English – the 'older brothers' in this family of peoples – are at the forefront of national revival. A previous poll showed that in England only 31% considered themselves English first and British second. Now 40% define themselves that way, meaning the new community – the 'British people' – is melting away before our eyes.
This return to historical roots does not please politicians and authorities, as it runs counter to the country's proclaimed ideals. The powerful Finance Minister Gordon Brown took the threat of 'Balkanization of Britain' seriously. Explaining his position on the eve of the 300th anniversary of the Anglo-Scottish union, he spoke about the common values on which Great Britain is founded. These values, in his opinion, have nothing to do with ethnicity; they are 'freedom for all', 'social responsibility and justice'. Brown believes that the existing union cannot be treated irresponsibly.
However, it is worth mentioning that national self-awareness, at least in the modern British version, has not yet led to serious interethnic friction. In other words, the Scots and the English are not about to fight or quarrel, and their rivalry is limited to football and rugby matches against each other. The same November poll demonstrated this well. When sociologists asked the highly provocative question 'In your opinion, are there many or few Scots in government bodies?', they received simply model answers. 77% of respondents in Scotland and 76% in England said they did not care at all.
Moreover, sociologists also partially debunked the well-known myth that football fans' dislike for their closest neighbors supposedly goes so far that the English universally root against the Scottish national team, and the Scots unanimously support England's opponents. In the south of Albion, 70% of residents are ready to support the northerners in such a situation. In Scotland, sports separatism is stronger, but even there, almost every second person – 48% of the population – is ready to cheer for the English in international matches.
Leave with Their Oil
When discussing the theoretical possibility of the breakup of Britain, skeptics most often focused on economic issues. The fact is that Scottish regions are generally less developed than English counties and cities. This leads to the central government collecting most of its taxes in the south of the country, while the amount received by the budget from Scotland is ten times less than English collections. If the north secedes, the local government would immediately face a budget hole of 6-11 billion pounds, which would have to be closed somehow. Currently, the UK government handles this. Currently, among all British constituent parts, Scotland ranks second in terms of government spending per capita (only the backward Northern Ireland is ahead). This leads the British press, when commenting on potential Scottish separatism, to note that Edinburgh, as the capital of an independent state, would face great difficulties. For example, the need to raise taxes, which would not increase the popularity of the self-governing authorities.
Indeed, in the event of its independence, Scotland becomes a regional energy king. The point is that 90% of British oil is from northern, i.e., Scottish fields. Accordingly, practically all hydrocarbon wealth goes to Edinburgh. Furthermore, it is especially noted that Scotland's population is relatively small, only 5 million people. So, as a worthy example to follow, one can take, for example, Norway or some of the small but terribly rich states of the Persian Gulf, like Kuwait or Qatar.
Local nationalists are confident that independence is good for their small homeland. This idea is mainly promoted by the Scottish Regional Party headed by Alex Salmond. He believes that Labor in London oppose independence only because they want to retain power. The SNP indeed enjoys substantial support in the north of Britain and could become a serious force in the Scottish parliament in the very near future.
By the way, it is this parliament that causes a certain resentment among the English. The fact is that there are four representative bodies in Great Britain – one main, in London, and three regional ones – in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. These small parliaments have existed for less than ten years with the blessing of the central government as elements of some autonomy, giving different parts of the kingdom the opportunity to participate in governing the country. However, England did not get a separate assembly of deputies, because it already had its own, big and real British parliament. The Conservative Party is now advocating for equality and demands the creation of an English chamber of people's representatives, because without this institution the south of the country turned out to be somewhat deprived of rights.
Velvet Precedent
Scotland, seeking independence, does not have to look far for examples; it is enough to cross the Pas-de-Calais. In continental Europe over the last decade and a half, several major splits of large and small powers have occurred. And for almost any scenario, a close precedent can be found. There is, for example, the Soviet path of relatively peaceful collapse, which went without major wars but was accompanied by an almost universal sharp economic decline. There is the Yugoslav misfortune, where only Macedonia, Slovenia and now Montenegro managed to escape the metropolis relatively peacefully. The rest had to go through a long series of wars with Belgrade. But the closest, probably, is the 'velvet' Czechoslovak precedent.
The union of Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia was formed in 1918 as one of the fragments of the once powerful Austrian Empire. Czechs and Slovaks are kindred peoples, very close in language and culture, so coexistence in a single state did not cause them much trouble. At the same time, the Czech Republic was always considered the more economically developed part of the federation, while Slovakia in most indicators (such as GDP, population, influence in federal government, etc.) remained in the role of 'younger brother'. Moreover, despite the fact that strong Prague subsidized weak Bratislava, it was the Slovaks who spoke more actively about independence. Thus, in particular, the Czech government after the 'Velvet Revolution' leaned towards preserving the unified state, while in Slovakia politicians wanted either confederation or independence. In 1992, this led to Bratislava declaring separation, although in both parts of the country public opinion was split equally on this issue.
The life of these two countries after the split remained quite normal; no terrible cataclysms occurred in either the Czech Republic or Slovakia. Moreover, both republics synchronously joined the EU, are members of NATO, hold elections and economic reforms and, it seems, have gotten used to living apart and do not regret the 'velvet divorce'. Something similar will most likely happen in the Serbo-Montenegrin case, where both the elder and younger brother will now go their separate ways.
Sweet Dreams and Real Nightmares
But it is less believable that Great Britain can be broken up in the same or similar way. After all, both Serbia and Montenegro, and Czechoslovakia disintegrated at a time of sharp weakening of central authority, political and economic reforms. No such drastic changes have been observed on Albion; state power here works quite successfully. Moreover, it is still unknown whether the results of recent British polls can be directly projected onto a hypothetical referendum. A sociologist can be easily told that you want an independent Scotland or, conversely, the final separation of England, because here your vote does not depend on anything. It is a completely different matter to vote for it in an official plebiscite, understanding that you are making a choice between the not-bad and the unknown. In such a situation, people usually tend to think much more carefully about their actions.
An indirect confirmation of this was the Belgian story. This state is a classic example of a successful bi-communal union. Belgium speaks two languages: the French-speaking Walloon south opposes the Flemish north. Relations between the communities are far from cloudless, there are nationalist organizations, and the separatist party 'Vlaams Belang' in some regions of the north gets a third of the votes in elections. As usual, the division also goes along economic lines: Flanders is a more successful and prosperous region. This situation is not very stable, and it is not excluded that in a few years Belgium will seriously discuss some bill on the division of the state along national lines.
In December, one of the local TV channels, RTBF, tried to simulate such a situation. Journalists broadcast a fake report that the Flemish parliament had decided to separate the province. A terrible scandal broke out: Belgians were seriously frightened. Not only politicians were outraged; ordinary people on the streets also raged against the overly creative TV reporters. It suddenly became clear that for many, the embodiment of separatism in real life seemed a terrible event, almost a catastrophe. Nevertheless, having recovered from the shock, locals would not mind talking again about how nice it would be to live separately from those Walloons or, conversely, from those Flemings.
By hook or by crook
An example of consistent but peaceful separatism in the Western world can be the Quebec referendums. The history of Canada developed such that the relatively small territory of the province of Quebec with a French-speaking population had long been part of the former British colony. In the century before last, armed uprisings of Francophones for independence occurred here, but nowadays no one intends to fight against the Governor General. Instead, local separatist forces actively attempt to separate Quebec from English-speaking Canada through plebiscites.
The first referendum on the future of the province took place back in 1980. At that time, the "rebellious" region was governed by the Parti Québécois, led by an active supporter of independence, René Lévesque. The federal Canadian government, naturally, campaigned for the preservation of the unitary state, and separatists were not supported even by Francophone politicians who then held top positions in the country's government. The Quebec community split for the first time into supporters of independence and doubters, with public sentiment fluctuating.
It should be noted that the Parti Québécois approached the issue very cautiously. The province was offered to break away from Canada politically but not economically, which presumably was meant to reassure skeptics and faint-hearted who feared an impending financial collapse. Thus, the separatists intended to take away from Ottawa all legislative power on the territory of Quebec, the right to diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and also secure the exclusive right to collect taxes. At the same time, the newly minted state planned to maintain an "economic association, including a common currency" with the rest of Canada. Nevertheless, independence did not pass in 1980: sovereignist Quebec received only 40% of the vote.
However, such a large percentage of independence supporters gave reason to say that a fundamentally different ethno-cultural identity was forming in the province – from Francophone Canadians, locals were turning into Quebecers, an ethnic group more oriented toward their traditional territory, their culture, and less associating themselves with greater Canada. This was also facilitated by the long-standing antagonism between England (to this day, the head of the Canadian state is formally Elizabeth II) and France, which many in Quebec still perceive as a cultural metropolis. Plus, the province enjoyed significant autonomy, not only in self-government: the official language of the region has long been considered French, whereas in the English-speaking provinces of Canada, the language of Balzac and Hugo is practically not used.
The second referendum was held by the Parti Québécois 15 years later. It showed that the number of separatists in the province was slowly growing. In 1995, the split of the country by linguistic communities was avoided literally by a miracle: separatists were short of just six-tenths of a percent (less than 30,000 votes) for a majority. The independence of Quebec was again rejected, but most likely only temporarily. If the trend of recent decades continues, the next plebiscite will surely create an independent Quebec Republic.
Sovereignty not wanted even for free
There is, however, a territory in Europe where the population in the last century stubbornly refused imposed independence and demanded annexation to the mainland. This refers to Saar, which is now one of the smallest states within the Federal Republic of Germany. After each world war, the victors persistently offered the residents of this territory to decide their own fate. But both times Saar preferred to become one of the German regions.
Saar is one of the border regions with a mixed population that Paris and Berlin divided for over eighty years – from the Franco-Prussian War to World War II. But while the population of Alsace and Lorraine changed allegiance and citizenship without referendums, Saar was given a choice in 1935 and 1955. The last time, the main option offered to locals was nearly full independence: this territory could have become a third German state alongside the FRG and GDR. However, the majority of Saarlanders did not appreciate such a generous gift: two-thirds of the votes were cast against independence.
Interestingly, from 1945 until the last referendum, Saar was under strict French control. Paris naturally made serious efforts to ensure that this industrially developed land never returned to the German state. In Paris, they intended to keep Saar as part of France, but despite all efforts, the German majority spoke in favor of a unified German state. By the way, in 1935, the majority of supporters of reunification with Germany was even greater: then nine out of ten voters voted in favor of the Third Reich.
Old World separatism
Currently, there are more than a dozen places in the Old World alone where separatist tendencies exist (or could potentially develop). In some places, the threat of separatism is quite real, while in others it exists only at the level of language or culture. There are states that have become accustomed to the constant threat of secession of outlying regions and have learned to mitigate flare-ups of intercommunal hostility, and there are those that have not yet considered that the epidemic of separatism could also affect prosperous corners of the continent.
This may sound surprising today, but just a hundred years ago, traveling from the Atlantic to the Urals, one would cross only two state borders, and the complete list of European states numbered only about twenty (including microstates like Liechtenstein). Today, that many independent countries can be found only within the territory of the former socialist bloc. And there still exist a number of regions where, under favorable conditions, small but independent states could form.
Italy and Spain can be considered record holders in terms of the number of potential separatist zones. In Spain, the most famous region that ideally seeks complete secession or at least broader autonomy than currently is the Basque Country. However, there are other outlying areas craving greater independence, such as Catalonia. In Italy, which was pieced together in the second half of the 19th century from heterogeneous fragments with experience of independent existence, a number of border territories with their own ethnic characteristics have survived to this day. In the north of the country, for example, there is the German-speaking region of South Tyrol, in the Trieste area the local population has Slavic origins, and in the northwest there are areas with a mixed Italian-French population.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that even the Italian-speaking regions themselves differ greatly from each other. For example, a Sicilian speaking quickly in his dialect will be understood with some difficulty by a native of the north of the country. And the speech of the indigenous inhabitants of Sardinia is so sharply different from the dialects of the continental 'boot' that the island's dialect can well be considered a separate language of the Romance group. In addition, northern Italy, as is known, is an industrially developed and quite prosperous region, while the economy of the south has been steadily stagnating despite all the efforts of the central government.
The latter circumstance was exploited by the most famous (apart from the Basque ETA) of the separatist movements in Western Europe — the Northern League, which achieved serious success in the 1990s. At that time, this party advocated for the breakup of the country and the formation of an independent state of Padania in northern Italy. This led to a point where the Northern League began winning elections in potential Padania. The party leader, Umberto Bossi, even shocked the public by convening an unofficial Padanian parliament and declaring the independence of the northern regions from the podium. But it did not go beyond slogans and speeches; there were no referendums, let alone noisy popular demonstrations in support of Bossi's movement (the League's leader, by the way, sharply condemned calls for violent methods of struggle for independence, preferring the path of peaceful pressure and referendums). Nevertheless, on the Padanian idea, the Northern League gained certain weight and became an influential force, an important element of Italy's right-wing party coalition.