Much has already been written about the 'penetration of Muslims into Europe,' the 'expansion of Islam,' the 'Islamization of Europe,' and the significance of this topic can only grow; for indeed, in Western and Central Europe, the number of people who have immigrated from the Islamic world is continuously increasing (many would say 'threateningly'). Thus, in Great Britain, Muslims make up approximately 2 million out of a total population of 60 million; in France, 5 million out of 60 million; in Germany, 3.2 million out of 83 million; in Italy, 1 million out of 57 million; in the Netherlands, 800,000 out of 16 million; in Sweden, 300,000 out of 9 million; in Spain, 400,000 out of 40 million; in Denmark, 160,000 out of 5 million; in Belgium, 400,000 out of 10 million; in Austria, 300,000 out of 8 million. That does not seem like so much. True, the birth rate of Muslims is more than three times that of the non-Muslim population. According to forecasts, their numbers will double by 2015, while the share of others will decrease by 3.5%. It is not uncommon to hear talk now that by the middle of this century, Muslims, at least in France, and possibly in other Western European countries, will outnumber the non-Muslim population. It should also be borne in mind that the total population of Europe, according to UN forecasts, will decline from 738 million (in 2000) to 600 million by 2050. The trend is obvious.
The Muslim population is younger than the native population: thus, in France as a whole, the share of residents under 20 years old is 21%, while among Muslims it is 33%. In Germany, the corresponding figures are 18% and 33%, and the situation is roughly the same in other countries of the region.
In principle, one could say: so what if the percentage of the Muslim population is growing? It is not a matter of skin color or religion; all these people are already citizens of European states, we should not fall into racism, scream about the Islamization of Europe, and use terms like 'Eurabia,' 'Londonistan,' etc. But the concerns are not so much about ethnic and racial prejudices as about the growing influence of jihadist extremists on the Muslim population of European countries.
Muslims appeared in Western Europe as a result of the policy of importing labor after World War II. People from poor third-world countries were willing to take low-paying jobs that the local population did not want to do. England, the Netherlands, and France imported labor from their former colonies (to this day, most French Muslims come from the Maghreb countries, mainly Algeria; in England, from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh; in the Netherlands, from Indonesia and Suriname). And Germany, which had no colonies, imported from Turkey. In 1961, when the FRG concluded an agreement with Turkey on the hiring of labor, there were fewer than 7,000 Turks in the country; 30 years later, there were more than 2 million. Labor migrants were considered temporary workers who, after the expiration of their contract, having earned money, would return home. That is how it was at first. But after the first energy crisis and the unemployment it caused, it was decided to stop importing labor. In the FRG in the 1970s, hiring from other countries was suspended, and work permits were stopped for most foreigners. Some countries even developed programs to assist foreign workers with repatriation. However, most of those who came refused them: prospects at home were very uncertain, and returning to Europe would be impossible. Foreigners who decided to settle in the new country began to bring their relatives; the daughters of workers, upon growing up, married their fellow countrymen, who in turn also brought their relatives, and many children were born in accordance with Muslim traditions. Hence the growth of the Muslim population.
People from the same country tend to live compactly, giving rise to what has come to be called 'ghettoization,' the formation of ghettos. Two-thirds of British Muslims live in the Greater London area, a third of French Muslims live in or around Paris, a third of German Muslims live in the industrial Ruhr region. In Marseille, Muslims exceed 25% of the population; in Malmö (Sweden), 20%; in Paris, Brussels, and Birmingham, 15%; in London, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Oslo, The Hague, and Copenhagen, 10%. Last year in Amsterdam, the name Muhammad was in first place among the most popular names given to newborn boys; this year, that name is in second place in England.
The first generation of migrants tried, if not to assimilate with the local population, then at least to prove their loyalty and integration into local society. But the second and third generations have a different mood. On the one hand, they have no language problems (unlike their ancestors), they studied in European schools and have the same level of education and professional qualifications as their peers from the local population.
On the other hand, most of them have come to realize that no matter how hard they try, they will never become full-fledged Frenchmen or Englishmen. Thus, the unemployment rate among European Muslims is typically twice as high as among the general population, including non-Muslim immigrants. The French press cited examples where resumes sent by young people with higher education to various firms are rejected much more often if they are Muslims. According to a survey conducted in December 2004, 87% of French people believe that, all other things being equal, it is "somewhat harder" or "much harder" for a person of Maghreb origin to find a job. Socially, Muslims feel they are still not accepted as one of their own, even if they are in no way inferior to their peers born in "white" families. Many have bitterly realized that they are caught between two worlds. Their old homeland does not need them, and they don't know it, often speaking its language worse than the European one; but in the country of their birth, they have not become "fellow citizens," an integral part of the nation. They are seen as outsiders. ("They've flooded here," they say in our country, the same can be heard in any Western European country.)
This applies to both psychological and everyday differences. For example, the British are unhappy that at bus stops, "outsiders" do not line up as is customary in England, but "crowd in." Many such examples can be given.
It is not surprising that young Muslims, not wanting to assimilate into a society they perceive as negatively disposed towards them, began searching for their identity, and they identify themselves not with a distant "ancestral homeland" but with something incomparably more significant – Islam. Studies conducted in France and Germany have shown that second- and especially third-generation Muslims are less integrated into society than their fathers and grandfathers. Feeling like victims of discrimination, they find in Islam a sign of their identity. In France, the number of people declaring themselves as believing and practicing Muslims grew by 25% in just seven years (1994-2001). There is the well-known story of the hijab (female headscarves), which were banned for schoolgirls. But many young Muslim women began to wear not the hijab but the niqab, which completely covers the face, leaving only a slit for the eyes. A 24-year-old resident of London said in an interview: "For me, it's not just an item of clothing, but a factor of solidarity." Another added: "If I dressed in European style, I could be an Indian or anyone, but in the niqab I feel like a Muslim woman."
Can it be said that all this came as an unpleasant surprise to the governments of Western European countries? Yes and no. Experts have long predicted the negative consequences of insufficient attention to the problem of integrating the descendants of migrants into society, but do governments ever listen to experts?
However, it cannot be said that no attention was paid to this problem at all. It is believed that there are three main models: the French (assimilationist), German (segregationist), and English (pluralistic).
In France, any person with French citizenship is a member of the national community. Anyone, regardless of country of origin, can become a French citizen, and anyone born on its territory automatically becomes a citizen. Immigrants effectively renounce their previous identity and adopt the values and behavioral characteristics inherent to the French.
In contrast to this model, in Germany citizenship is based on the principle of "blood right," meaning an ethnic rather than a civic approach, and a person born on German territory does not become a citizen. This has led to segregation – the separation of the population of immigrant origin from German citizens.
The English model, finally adopted in 1985, consists of the state recognizing various communities within the national community that have the right to live in their own circles, preserving their traditions and values. This approach fits into the well-known concept of multiculturalism.
Thus, the three leading countries of Western Europe have chosen different strategies towards immigrants, including Muslims. And with regard to non-Muslim newcomers, this has largely worked: there are no particular problems with Poles, Czechs, Indians, or Chinese. But when it comes to Muslims, the results are roughly the same: in general, neither assimilation nor integration has taken place. In each country, there are immigrant communities, parallel societies, as it were, and no one has yet been able to propose a recipe for how to achieve that Muslims, while preserving their ethnic, cultural, and religious identity (which cannot be denied), feel like full-fledged citizens of the state that has given them shelter, as loyal to it as everyone else.
Numerous facts testify to the contrary. London, for example, became a haven for radical anti-Western groups after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. Imams in London mosques openly called for solidarity with the terrorists who blew up the New York Twin Towers; and only recently have extremists been prosecuted and arrests made. The bombings in London on July 7, 2005, were a shock for England. People saw on television screens a video recording of the "will" of one of the suicide bombers, a Pakistani speaking English with a Yorkshire accent, and it became clear that a person born and working all his life in England could cold-bloodedly kill his formal "fellow citizens." Then it became known that according to polls, 13% of British Muslims consider these murderers "martyrs." The number of extremists among Muslims sharply increased after the American-British intervention in Iraq, and religious leaders began to call for a merciless struggle to force the government to withdraw troops from Iraq. According to official data, the English police are monitoring 200 cells of Muslim extremists. A very telling episode was shown on television on the day when the post of Prime Minister passed from Tony Blair to Gordon Brown. In the crowd gathered near Buckingham Palace, from where the new prime minister departed after meeting the queen, a group of people stood out, chanting "Allahu Akbar!" and holding posters with the inscription "God, curse the queen!" They were carried by citizens of the United Kingdom...
Everyone knows about the riots perpetrated by young Muslims from the Paris suburbs and the outrages of Muslim extremists in Holland. Among the various aspects of this problem are electoral (none of the competing political parties will risk turning a significant segment of the population against itself), international (one cannot be at odds with Islamic countries, on which the economy largely depends). But in public opinion, which cannot be ignored in a democratic state, fear is growing more and more, caused by the rise of Islamism, jihadism, Muslim extremism; people are increasingly repeating the word "Al-Qaeda" with anxiety. Nationalistic, chauvinistic xenophobic parties and movements have long been active. To the credit of Western democracy, it must be said that in no country have they even come close to a level of popular support that would allow them to actually influence policy. But this, as everyone understands, is by no means a reason for complacency.
Georgy MIRSKY.
Politcom.ru