Millions of former compatriots, including ethnic Russians, are still forced to overcome numerous bureaucratic obstacles and tricks, proving their right to exist. We conclude a series of publications on Russia's migration policy and the authorities' attempts to benefit from the "natural disaster" that migrants have become for the country in solving its internal problems.
Contrary to sound forecasts and warnings from lawyers and experts about the inadequacy and even harmfulness of the draft new law "On Citizenship," which was developed by an interagency group led by the then deputy head of the presidential administration, Viktor Ivanov, it was nevertheless adopted by the Duma, signed by the president, and came into effect in 2002. The practice of its application confirmed the worst fears: the new long-awaited law brought no relief either to the country or to applicants for Russian citizenship from the republics of the former USSR. On the contrary, the law dealt a crushing blow to the hopes not only of compatriots who had already arrived or were planning to come to Russia, but also of millions of ethnic Russians sitting on packed suitcases. All of them were equalized in rights to obtain Russian citizenship status with Africans and "other Swedes."
Russian citizenship became out of reach for many military personnel. A new, now legislative curtain fell before them. Now, to become a citizen of Russia, one had to live here for at least five years, prove a legal source of income, and pass a Russian language exam. Yes, this is normal for foreigners from far abroad. But why treat Russians that way, whom the party and government once sent to the forefront of communist construction in the most remote corners of the USSR? The law was rightly dubbed "cannibalistic."
According to deputies who tried to prevent its adoption in this form, in fact a forged law was passed, not the agreed one. For the vote, they recall, the deputies were given a draft law that did not include previously approved amendments (such practice of text substitution is known since the times of Gorbachev's Supreme Soviet of the USSR). Moreover, according to a statement by 12 members of the Duma Committee on State Construction, the law was not considered at its meetings. In short, by hook or by crook, the law was "rammed through" by the pro-presidential majority. A group of deputies even planned to appeal to the Constitutional Court with a complaint about document fraud.
The public reacted to the adoption of the suffocating law in its own way. On June 20, 2003, the council of the all-Russian movement "For Human Rights" issued a statement about the work of deputy head of the presidential administration Viktor Ivanov on this law, demanding his "removal from the leadership of migration policy…". And on June 21, 2003, this statement was supported at the all-Russian conference "Civil Initiatives - to Democratic Parties". The conference decided to launch a campaign for Ivanov's resignation.
Credit must be given to the president – he quickly realized the fallacy of the new citizenship legislation. "The laws passed last year (2002) were intended to bring order to migration flows and make them transparent. What came out does not help solve these tasks. Rather, it creates serious problems for a large number of people," Vladimir Putin honestly stated in his address to the Federal Assembly.
After some time, on his initiative, amendments were introduced giving refugees and forced migrants a chance. In particular, the five-year residency requirement was abolished for those born on the territory of Russia, and a new simplified procedure for obtaining Russian citizenship was introduced for certain categories of citizens – contract servicemen, students who received education in Russia.
But according to experts, even the improved and corrected edition of the ill-fated 2002 law on citizenship of the Russian Federation did not solve the long-overdue and overdue problem of regulating migration flows in the country. "The amendments solve the citizenship problem by 40%," Duma deputy Viktor Alksnis told journalists. "But they do not solve the issue of the 27 million Russians who live outside Russia today." Apparently, no one knows the exact number of Russians abroad. The most commonly cited figure is 25 million.
At the local level, the bureaucratic barrier still rages. The amendment regarding the interpretation of the concept of "residence" still awaits implementation. Officials of the Federal Migration Service and its subdivisions still refer to this norm of the old law from 1993, assuring that it is the same as "registration." Still, in violation of Russian laws, local princelings in passport offices confiscate Russian passports from already legally legitimized Russian citizens, declaring them... non-citizens. Even, for example, in the presence of a Russian military pension, they send people to courts to prove their "residence," claiming that neither the work record book nor a certificate from the place of employment constitute documents for them.
Obviously, the migrants themselves bitterly joke that "green" documents are in use here. After all, many still remember the scandal that began the new independent life of the Federal Migration Service under General Konstantin Romodanovsky – then, as a result of a special operation, a gang of fraudsters selling Russian passports was caught. "What a disgrace," writes Lidia Grafova, head of the all-Russian "Forum of Migrant Organizations," with pain, "any drug dealer or terrorist can buy Russian citizenship in no time, while a penniless Russian migrant will be turned to exhaustion in the bureaucratic meat grinder, and then deported from Russia. And all seemingly according to the law."
With the arrival in 2004 of General Romodanovsky at the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), who was tasked with cleaning up the "migration stables," a hopeful shift towards humanizing resettlement processes began to emerge, and experts developed cautious optimism. It seems that after 15 years in this service, which underwent numerous reorganizations and survived seven directors, they began to distinguish between migrant flows themselves – labor migrants who do not need Russian citizenship and those returning permanently. Accordingly, both the laws and the attitude towards these flows must be adequate.
January 15, 2007, can be considered a revolutionary day for the migrant movement in Russia: new legislation came into effect. Now, illegal migrants arriving from the CIS (estimated at 5 to 20 million people, with the FMS citing 10 million) can register under a simplified procedure – even by sending a notification by mail. A powerful resource of the migration process, such as employer liability, has been included. This refers to amendments to the law "On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in Russia," the "Code of Administrative Offenses," and the new law "On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons."
But, as human rights activists note, not everything is smooth here either. Still in force is the norm of the law "On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in Russia," due to which migrants are forced to leave for some time and then re-cross the Russian border to gain the right to simplified registration under the new law. Moreover, liberalization will not affect internal migration: for Russians with passports, a strict registration system will remain when moving from city to city for work. For whom and why is this needed? The question seems rhetorical.
A new state program to facilitate the voluntary resettlement of compatriots to Russia should also help move the heavy cart of migration problems in the right direction. The program was launched in 2006 by a decree of Vladimir Putin and "is aimed at uniting the potential of compatriots living abroad with the development needs of Russian regions." This presidential initiative is intended to help solve the country's demographic problems, attract labor, and populate large, for various reasons deserted Russian territories. Incidentally, the interdepartmental group for developing the state program for facilitating the voluntary resettlement of compatriots to Russia was again headed by presidential aide… Viktor Ivanov. Here you don't know who to feel more sorry for – him or the victims of his migration policy.
The program is designed for six years – from 2006 to 2012. It is expected to be implemented in three stages. The main one has already begun: the country's regions have determined how many people they need and how many they can accept. A serious PR campaign was launched around the project on all television and radio channels. It seemed that resettlement grace was about to pour into Russia. After all, this time the state apparently seriously intended to help both itself and its compatriots, backing words with material assistance. The so-called "compensation package" includes part of the costs associated with returning to the homeland, a one-time allowance, partial or full payment of expenses for job search, medical treatment, kindergarten, school, or vocational school. Those who cannot find a job immediately will receive a monthly allowance.
"More than a year has passed since the adoption of the state program to facilitate the voluntary resettlement of compatriots to Russia," says Lidia Grafova, "and only five families have been moved from Latvia to Kaliningrad. Such a soothing PR rattle... By the way, these people already had Russian citizenship." In early July 2007, the Federal Migration Service made public official information on how the government resettlement program worked during this time. The result is so far disappointing, to say the least: only 10 families have moved. Although the authorities announced their intention to resettle at least 300 thousand qualified specialists in Russia. However, the FMS promised a resettlement boom in August. But September is already coming to an end…
It is obvious that the people, after many years of vain expectations, deceptions, and suffering, have lost faith that anyone in Russia is actually waiting for them. And if we speak specifically about the former Soviet Baltic states, the fact cited by Grafova indicates that, in reality, Russian Balts are not so eager to return home. They prefer to live there, despite the anti-Russian hysteria and even though hundreds of thousands of them have been declared non-citizens.
According to demographic expert Zhanna Zainchkovskaya, head of the migration laboratory at the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia's need for migrants until 2020 will be at least 10 million people. That is, to overcome the demographic crisis, approximately one million people per year must come to the country and settle permanently.
The modest interim result of the compatriot resettlement program after its loud and comprehensive presentation leads to the reflection that the time for active and effective use of migration as a tool to solve the country's internal demographic problems has been hopelessly and, probably, forever lost. The turbulent flow of resettlers from the 1990s has practically dried up, and a few years ago even a return flow back to the republics emerged (primarily regarding Kazakhstan). Many Russians who wanted to leave the newly independent republics have long since left. Not to Russia, mostly – to far-abroad countries. Today, only a weak trickle remains of those who, for some reason, did not have time or could not leave. These are mainly compatriots, including Russians, from Central Asia. It seems – this is the last breath of the Russian transit that the country can still catch.
But there remains a fairly powerful parallel flow of labor migration from CIS countries – mainly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Moldova. They do not disdain any work, even the dirtiest and lowest-paid, which local residents of Russia no longer want to do. Will the authorities be able to effectively use at least this flow for the benefit of the country, or will it turn out "as usual"?
Alla YAROSHINSKAYA.
IA Rosbalt