Britain's relations with the European Union have far from always been harmonious
What is the reason that membership in one of the most prestigious world clubs, which other countries strive to join by hook or by crook, causes irritation and a desire to get as far away as possible among many Britons? At the same time, as the BBC notes, the vast majority of islanders enjoy traveling to Europe for holidays, adore European cuisine, and do not disdain European design in clothing, furniture, or automobiles.
Historical confrontation
For most of its modern history, the United Kingdom has been building an empire. Strangely, Europeans also somehow realized the benefits of colonies and constantly interfered with the "mistress of the seas" in free trade and conquest. Britain considered its continental neighbors at best a nuisance, and at worst enemies to be brought into line. Enemies that from time to time threatened the very existence of these blessed islands.
Leading historian, Professor of Gresham College Vernon Bogdanor, in one of the public lectures organized by the Museum of London specifically ahead of the referendum on Britain's EU membership, noted that the events of World War II had a huge impact on the British attitude towards Europe. "It is widely believed that Britain faced its 'darkest hour' [phrase from a famous speech by Winston Churchill, who used it to describe the period between the surrender of France in 1940 and the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, when Britain was the only force opposing fascists in Europe – author's note] alone. This belief still fuels the conviction among a considerable number of the country's citizens that the best and most reliable friend of the United Kingdom is itself. And if one can count on anyone's help, it is only the help of the United States," Bogdanor is sure.
Not abroad, but overseas
Unlike many other European countries that formed long-term alliances with each other based on common faith or common history, Britain never bothered with ethical considerations about "brotherly peoples" or "sacred duty" and changed allies and enemies depending on the specific situation.
Henry John Temple, Lord Palmerston, speaking in the British Parliament in 1848, uttered the famous phrase: "We have no eternal allies, we have no perpetual enemies. Only our interests are eternal and perpetual, and it is our duty to follow them." Almost 170 years later, another British Prime Minister – David Cameron – said that one should not count on love for the common European home from the United Kingdom either. "We have the character of an island nation: we are independent, straightforward, and passionately defend our sovereignty," he said. "We might as well try to change our national character as to drain the English Channel. That is why our attitude towards the European Union is based on practical interest, not on emotions."
There is a fairly widespread opinion that although one can now easily get from London to Paris "without getting one's feet wet," the centuries-old island mentality still prevents Britons from feeling part of the common European home. After all, just 10 years ago, a person abroad was said to be "overseas."
But allow me, what about other island states that are members of the European Union? What about Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus? Where is their island mentality, and why don't they object to ceding part of their power to Brussels for the right to be part of the big European club?
The same Professor Bogdanor believes that the reason is not only the island mentality, but also the long period during which Britain was one of the greatest empires in the world: "Britain is accustomed to giving orders, not obeying them."
Neither here nor there
The foundations of the current European Union were laid immediately after the end of World War II. Many politicians were guided by a perfectly understandable desire to bind European countries more closely together in order to avoid repeating the bloodbath. Even Winston Churchill did not object to this, supporting "a system under which we can all live in peace, security, and freedom... something like the United States of Europe."
However, after such a promising start, the Britons preferred to sit on the sidelines and see where all these European initiatives would lead. When in 1957 the six founding countries (France, Belgium, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg) signed the so-called Treaty of Rome, forming the European Economic Community (EEC), London did not wish to join. One of the main architects of the EEC, the Frenchman Jean Monnet, explained it as follows: "Perhaps it was the price of victory in the war: the illusion that you could keep everything you had and change nothing."
It did not work out to change nothing. Britain watched with envy from across the Channel as the economies of France and Germany soared, while its own stalled. In 1961, London finally decided to join the EEC.
But that was not the case. The President of France, resistance hero Charles de Gaulle, although he addressed his occupied country from BBC studios (for which he later presented the corporation with a handmade tapestry that to this day occupies a place of honor in its building), twice vetoed Britain's membership in the EEC. He accused it of a "deeply rooted aversion to European integration and a greater interest in ties with the United States."
In fact, the heroic general was not entirely right: after all, all the countries that joined the EEC did so, to a greater or lesser extent, for their own economic and political benefit, and accusing London of being 'against the European idea' while seeking exclusively 'personal gain' was not entirely fair. However, de Gaulle, according to contemporaries, was a stubborn man, and it was only the conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath who finally managed to bring Britain into Europe in 1973, and only after the general was forced to leave the presidency. In 1973, by the way, he was no longer alive.
The British voted to join the EEC in a referendum in 1975 with a convincing result of 67%. At that time, the main political parties and all national newspapers supported this step. However, the debate about 'whether we should be in Europe' did not end there: after all, membership in the EEC did not bring immediate positive results. The country was still shaken by strikes, there were periodic power outages, and due to rising oil prices, inflation stubbornly remained in double digits.
The Iron Lady vs. Brussels
In the 1980s, relations between London and Brussels were extremely tense. In 1984, Margaret Thatcher managed (after four years of negotiations) to reduce the country's contributions to the common European budget. The Prime Minister argued (quite rightly) that British farmers received significantly less subsidies than their European counterparts, and therefore the British taxpayer should not support them. In addition, Britain did not sign the EEC Social Charter, deciding that it would determine the rights and responsibilities of its own population independently.
In 1985, French economist with socialist views, Jacques Delors, became president of the European Commission. He confidently began steering Europe toward greater integration and a common currency. This was completely unsuitable for Margaret Thatcher.
In 1988, she was invited to speak at the European College in Bruges. The 'Bruges speech' still serves as a source of inspiration for most Eurosceptics in British politics.
'Inviting me to tell you about my views on Europe,' said Thatcher, 'is like inviting Genghis Khan to share his opinion on the advantages of peaceful coexistence.' 'Europe,' continued the Iron Lady, 'did not come into being with the signing of the Treaty of Rome. The European Community is only one manifestation of European identity, but it is not the only one.' 'Europe will be stronger precisely because France remains France, Spain remains Spain, and Britain remains Britain, with its own customs, traditions, and national character. It would be a great folly to force them all into some kind of common European uniform.'
The speech was liked by many, but for the fairly numerous supporters of the European path among her own ministers, it was too much. As a result, a struggle erupted within the Conservative Party itself, which eventually led to Thatcher's resignation.
Closer and closer and closer...
Margaret Thatcher failed to stop the European Union on the path of political integration. Her successor at 10 Downing Street, John Major, signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The treaty legally established the transfer of a number of powers from individual governments to Brussels. However, for Eurosceptics, it became an undermining of the main foundation of British statehood – the full and absolute independence of Parliament.
Labourite and big supporter of a common European home, Tony Blair, became Prime Minister of Britain in 1997. His party's majority in Parliament was so large that for a while his cabinet could pursue almost any policy. Blair quickly established relations with Brussels, signed Britain up for participation in the Social Charter, and began to eye the euro.
Britain could well have become a member of the eurozone on that wave, but Blair was somewhat unlucky with the economy: at that particular historical moment it was growing and developing rapidly, and the British were not entirely sure that the euro game was worth the candle. Moreover, his own finance minister, future Prime Minister Gordon Brown, declared that 'if Britain joins the eurozone, I will resign.'
For Blair, this was a heavy blow. Throughout his years in power, he continued to advocate for closer ties with the European Union and joining the euro. In an interview with BBC presenter Jeremy Paxman, Blair said he would be happy if he were remembered as the prime minister who brought Britain into the eurozone. 'I am absolutely convinced,' he said, 'that our country's place and its destiny are tied to Europe. Why should we reject a union that lies at our doorstep? Such a rejection would be madness. It is an economic union, and we should not reject it for political reasons. I believe it would be a betrayal of our national interests.'
A New Turn
'I know the British. They are not passengers. They are drivers.' With this statement, current British Prime Minister David Cameron began one of his speeches on the country's membership in the EU.
One of the Conservative Party's election promises was to hold a referendum on whether the country should remain a member of the European Union. Neither the prime minister himself nor most members of his cabinet want to break ties with the EU. Being pragmatists, politicians understand that this would be a one-way ticket with no right of return. Cameron's goal is to achieve such changes in Britain's relationship with the EU that the majority of the country's population would wholeheartedly approve of maintaining their European status.
Leaders of other EU countries would also like Britain to stay, but they are not ready to compromise the fundamental principles of the European club.
Once you let the genie out of the bottle, you shouldn't expect it to willingly go back: having promised a referendum, you will have to hold it. David Cameron, of course, flattered the people by saying that he would never accept the position of a mere passenger, but he forgot to add that you will have to take the driving test sooner or later anyway. But in this case, history will be the one to administer it, and it is not inclined to give any leeway.