At the end of October, a summit of European Union leaders took place at Hampton Court Palace near London. The British, who currently hold the EU presidency, hoped that reviving the practice of such informal meetings would improve the situation in Europe. Europeans need a breakthrough - this year turned out to be very difficult for the EU. The failure of the European Constitution in referendums in France and the Netherlands, the stalling of the EU budget for 2007-2013, the obvious predominance of national interests over pan-European ones, the July terrorist attacks in London, and the confusion surrounding the elections in Germany - all of this plunged the European Union into the deepest crisis in its history.
However, contrary to expectations, no revolution took place at Hampton Court: everyone stuck to their own opinion. French President Jacques Chirac insisted on maintaining agricultural subsidies for at least the next eight years. British Prime Minister Tony Blair defended the British "rebate" in payments to the EU budget. Germany was represented at the meeting by outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who opposes the liberal reforms in the EU that the new Chancellor Angela Merkel hopes for. As a result, as the German newspaper Die Welt noted in its editorial comment, "the summit showed that EU partners are moving further and further away from each other."
The Expert magazine kindly provided us with an interview with Richard Whitman, director of European programs at Chatham House - the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), in which the prospects of European integration are discussed.
Order for now
- The results of the French and Dutch referendums have suspended the process of ratifying the EU constitution. For several months now, the European Constitution seems to have been forgotten. Will the European Union ever have a constitution? What will happen if it is never approved?
- No one can give a clear answer to such questions right now. Immediately after the failure of the constitution, the leaders agreed on a pause of, say, about six months - so that governments, politicians, and voters could calmly think and assess the situation. Now Europeans are postponing the decision on this issue until next year. But they will still have to do something. There are several options.
First, Europeans could forget about the constitution. However, this is unlikely, because more than half of the EU member states have already ratified it, and three years were spent writing the document before that. Second, they could come together again to write a new text. But most likely, the new constitution will turn out to be very similar to the old one, and time will be lost. Third, Europeans could edit the constitution - removing the most important provisions from it, which would then be ratified by national parliaments. But this creates a big problem: such an approach could greatly disappoint voters - it could be seen as an attempt to deceive the public and circumvent its will.
Any of these options is not easy, and it is not yet clear which one will ultimately be chosen. It is unclear, in particular, because of differences of opinion: for example, Britain would prefer that the issue of the constitution be removed from the agenda altogether. Meanwhile, today the main problem with the constitution is that it is not being talked about at all. If at the beginning of summer politicians discussed the issue and the topic did not leave the newspaper pages, today there is silence.
- But if the constitution is indeed forgotten, what will happen?
- It must be understood that even if the constitution had been approved by all countries, nothing would have happened until 2009 - that was when it was supposed to come into force according to the original plans. Therefore, in the near future, the EU can work without a constitution. But if we talk about a longer-term perspective, the task becomes significantly more complicated - especially in the context of the recent enlargement. Finally, difficulties with the constitution affect the mood in the EU. It was assumed that the document would give a new definition to the concept of the "European Union". Therefore, when it turned out that there was no agreement within the ranks as to what this concept actually is, further integration became problematic.
- Europe is in a stupor - making decisions when the Union has twenty-five member states is significantly more difficult than when there were fifteen.
- Europe is stuck in a transitional period. It has moved away from a foreign policy process that was understandable from the point of view of diplomacy, but it has not yet reached the state of institutions that states use to manage the political process. In other words, the EU is no longer quite diplomacy, but not yet a state. The problems are caused primarily by the fact that many perceive European processes as "still diplomacy". After all, no problems arise when decisions are made by three or five hundred participants in political institutions at the national level - say, in parliaments. But the fundamental principles of the EU are not the same as those of national parliaments. Therefore, twenty-five members is a problem, for example, when everyone wants to speak. Even if a representative from each country speaks for only an hour, that already amounts to more than a day. So it is necessary either to introduce restrictions, which is not very good, or to make decisions not at a big forum, but in working groups. But then insiders and outsiders appear, and the latter, for understandable reasons, are dissatisfied.
True, so far everything is not working as badly as one might have assumed before the enlargement. This is largely explained by the fact that the new EU member states are still learning to work at the European level. If they become more assertive and begin actively promoting their agenda, then one can assume that the system will work worse.
National interest
- Some EU members, such as Germany and France, are increasingly insistently proposing "multi-speed integration". Is this a way out of the situation when there are more members and no constitution?
- Such a method is not so bad. It increases the efficiency of decision-making, – in particular, this model has been tried in the WTO, where the main agreements are the result of agreements among key players. The problem is that within Europe it is very difficult to identify groups of countries with exactly the same set of problems. The euro zone with its twelve members is closest to such a “club within a club”. But anything smaller - the original six countries, the largest six countries, the Nordic countries - such combinations do not work. They cannot even form relatively permanent coalitions. A coalition of large countries immediately provokes opposition from small countries, which are the majority in the EU, and as a result the decision-making process does not accelerate, but on the contrary slows down.
- Recently, EU countries, especially the large ones, give priority to their national rather than pan-European interests. Is Europe really ceasing to think globally?
- Today the key problem of the European Union is a leadership deficit. There is an acute shortage of politicians of national caliber who can calculate which decisions will be good not only for their own country but also for the common European cause. After all, national and European interests do not necessarily contradict each other. Leaders like François Mitterrand or Helmut Kohl could work out solutions that were good for France, for Germany, and for Europe. In recent times, however, Europe has been less lucky - national leaders have begun to think of Europe as a “zero-sum game” - if someone wins, then someone must lose. France or Germany themselves are no longer part of the solution, but part of the problem, and by their actions they are aggravating it. For example, they constantly ignore the Maastricht criteria.
- Can the leaders of the European Commission compensate for the leadership deficit?
- The problem with the Commission is that it has not had a strong leader for the last ten years. The last prominent leader was Jacques Delors (President of the European Commission in 1985-1994). His successors Jacques Santer and Romano Prodi were noticeably weaker and far less effective. And Barroso was a compromise candidate, and by no means the first proposed to replace Prodi. A representative of a small state, he is clearly associated with a certain vector of European development - deregulation and liberalization of markets. And this circumstance immediately places France and Germany in opposition to all his initiatives.
- The EU countries have still not been able to agree on the budget for 2007-2013. Is this part of the struggle for national interests?
- Yes. Here the EU members are divided into several groups. Countries that are net payers do not want to pay into the European budget. The old EU countries that were recipients want to continue receiving a lot of money from the European budget. The new EU countries also want their share of the pie. Plus Britain with its rebate on EU budget payments obtained under Margaret Thatcher. In short, everyone has their own interest. But the most important thing is that Germany - the largest net payer to the EU budget - no longer wants to foot the bills.
- One can understand the Germans.
- Of course, Germany and German taxpayers should not be criticized for this - the burden of the EU budget should be distributed more evenly. The trouble, however, is something else: the budget uncertainty, compounded by problems with the constitution, significantly worsens the condition of the EU. However, I think that the EU budget problems will be resolved fairly quickly. Much faster and more easily than the constitutional problems.
Integration or Disintegration
- Does the failure of the constitution indicate that EU citizens have indeed become disillusioned with the European idea?
- Previously, ordinary Europeans were quite passive about integration - they accepted everything that their elites did. But then two events occurred. First, Europeans became disillusioned with governments in principle - in developed democracies, citizens everywhere are losing interest in politics. Second, voters developed a specific question for the euro-integrationists: are the leaders, whom they do not particularly trust, leading them in the right direction? Therefore, elites can no longer automatically rely on voter approval of their actions taken in the process of European integration.
This completely changes the context of integration. The failure of the constitutional referendums showed that governments can no longer make decisions with which society disagrees.
- If governance improves at the national level, will Europeans regain interest in the European integration project?
- Interest may return in two cases. First, if the leading EU economies start growing again. European integration progressed best during periods of sustained economic growth. This is especially true for Britain - Euroscepticism falls when the economy grows. Second, and this is even more important, if events in the outside world bring EU countries closer together. I do not think that in the 21st century talk of European integration helping to prevent war in Europe is still relevant: World War II is now merely a historical event. For European integration today, what matters more is what happens in the rest of the world. During the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1992, there was a major breakthrough in relations within the EU - Europe for the first time understood that its interests may differ from American ones. With the rise of new poles of power such as China or India, Europeans will feel their commonality much more strongly. Although it will not be easy.
- But what will happen if the key EU countries still fail to manage their economies? If, say, the German economy never “gets going” - neither in a year, nor in two, nor in five? Is there a risk of disintegration, of the EU falling apart?
- I think quite a few European politicians are losing sleep searching for an answer to this question. For a long time, integration in Europe was considered a very fast, intensive process, in a sense even universal. In fact, it is a unique phenomenon. Looking at the rest of the world, all attempts to repeat the European integration experience have led to far more modest results - usually simple trade blocs. The point is that Europe had a special microclimate that facilitated the emergence and strengthening of integration. If this climate changes now, I am not sure that integration will not suffer.
If Germany really does have long-term economic problems, this could change the European microclimate. If EU countries do not agree on the long-term goals of European integration, the same will happen. The same risk exists if the EU never gains strong leaders. It seems to me that many politicians in Europe understand that these risks exist and that they need to do something to prevent European integration from going into reverse.
Islamic challenge
- After the London attacks, security issues and the problem of terrorism have moved to the forefront. In many European countries, the proportion of the Muslim population is significant. And not everywhere is this proportion sufficiently integrated.
- Europeans realized the importance of internal security much more slowly than Americans. European integration helps solve security problems - suffice it to recall the coordinated actions of the police of several European countries in searching for the terrorists who carried out the bombings in Madrid and London.
Another matter is the situation with Muslim minorities in the EU states. European countries are only now realizing that they contain diverse ethnic and religious communities. And, in the opinion of many, the experiment of creating a multicultural society has failed. The question arises - what to do now, what to replace it with? For now, it is unclear. Meanwhile, some of the values advocated by radical Islamists are incompatible with liberal democracy - minorities in Europe could potentially become a serious source of social instability.
Of course, there is a difference between the US and the EU: in Europe we are faced with an internal problem, not an external one. But I am not sure that internal and external problems in relations with the Muslim world are so easily separated. They are simply two sides of the same coin. However, it is clear that Europe's response to the threat of Muslim terrorism will be different. In particular, because of the impossibility of resolving the issue by military means. This will take much more time. Europe's disunity will also have an effect - although Europeans will have to coordinate their activities, there is no analogue to the FBI or the CIA here.
- Will this affect the European Union's immigration policy?
- People have been talking about this for about ten years. The EU initiated the Barcelona Process (an initiative for socio-economic cooperation between the EU and the countries of North Africa. – Ed.) in 1995 because of concerns about migration issues. Developed countries are a magnet for migrants, everyone understands that. Therefore, our goal is the development of neighboring countries, which would become richer. And also the coordination of migration policy within the EU - today each country has its own rules, which creates confusion. Some EU countries declare amnesties, for example Spain, which has carried out an amnesty for illegal migrants several times. As a result, new migrants from North Africa rushed into it hoping to fall under a new amnesty.
The Spirit of Europe
- Enlargement remains one of the most important issues for the EU. Next in line is Romania, which, let's be honest, is quite poor. Moreover, although it has rebuilt its legal framework to meet EU requirements, enforcement of the laws there is weak - Brussels admits this too. Why does Europe need Romania at all? What will it bring there besides its 22 million people?
- In the future, enlargement will become a far more complex process. If you look at the 2004 enlargement, it is clear that some of the countries were objectively not ready to join the EU, but they could not be left out for political reasons. The most striking example is Poland.
Romania is an obvious problem. It is absolutely clear that the EU will impose stricter requirements on Romania's and Bulgaria's membership in the Union. But this is a big problem for the EU itself - earlier, “transitional conditions” mostly concerned secondary issues such as environmental policy, but now we are talking about key issues like the movement of labor. I am more than confident that before Romania joins the EU in 2007 or 2008, a whole range of European governments will try to introduce more transitional restrictions for it than for the countries that became EU members in 2004.
But saying “no” to the Romanians is already too difficult for political reasons. And although some politicians may think that the promise given to Bucharest was a mistake, it is hardly possible now to save face and refuse Romania.
- The EU has promised potential EU membership to the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania. Will it work?
- In my opinion, in foreign policy the strongest area of the EU is precisely the enlargement policy. The prospect of membership acts like a magnet on potential candidates. But this instrument is very long-term. If you look at Bosnia, you can see that the agreement on joint police patrols - by the police of Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian-Croat confederation - coincided in time with the signing of the association agreement between the EU and Serbia and Montenegro. I don't think this happened by chance. The Western Balkans are a knot of interconnected problems, and it would make sense for the EU to talk not with each of these countries individually, but with a single bloc. Yes, Croatia may join the EU earlier due to its level of development, but Serbia should go in the same group with Bosnia or Macedonia - as the Central European countries did.
- But if in 2015 or 2020 the countries of the region really begin to seriously apply for EU membership, then EU residents will have to vote on ratifying agreements on their entry into the European club. Can you imagine a referendum in Denmark on Albania's or Serbia's accession to the EU? After all, European newspapers write about these countries even worse than about Russia.
- For candidate countries, this means they will have to really change in order to convince not only governments but also EU public opinion of their readiness for membership. The hardest will be for Turkey - before it gains the right to EU membership, it will need to become a truly European country. In the future, accession conditions will become tougher, and the conditions of the transition period will become tougher, so the path to full membership could be very long.
- By the way, about Turkey. Negotiations on its accession have begun, but many European countries still do not consider Turkey sufficiently European - for religious and cultural reasons. Will Turkey be accepted?
- The negotiations with Turkey have sparked a debate in Europe about the limits of enlargement - this is a new topic for us. During the Cold War it was irrelevant. And five years ago it was also irrelevant, since many countries to the east and south were too economically underdeveloped. Now we have to think about what the EU could ultimately become. So the Turkish question is very important. But it is not a problem for today's politicians; it is a problem for the next generation of politicians.
In the coming years we will hear a lot about where Europe's borders should run. Should integration reach the Caucasus? Should it affect Ukraine or Belarus? These debates are becoming less and less abstract. What would happen if a country with liberal democracy, separation of religion and state, a market economy, but located in North Africa, wanted to become an EU member? On what basis would you rule out that possibility? When the European community first formed, Algeria was part of it, which was formally not a colony but an integral part of France. Spanish Melilla and Ceuta are also in Africa. So geography does not give us an answer. The debate about Europe's borders is rather a debate about the "spirit of Europe," not about Turkey's or any other country's ability to use European legislation.
- And what is the "spirit of Europe"?
- Alas, no one can answer this question. Much is said now about common culture and history. But the "spirit of Europe" is too complex a concept to define it with one simple advertising slogan. In different countries, for different ages, different professional groups, this concept will have different meanings. Just as the concept of "nation-state" has different meanings for all these groups.
- What can countries oriented toward the European Union, such as Ukraine or Georgia, expect from the EU?
- Not very much. The European Union will be so busy solving its own problems in the coming years that it will not get around to potential candidates. It will be quite difficult for Europeans to convince such countries - like, we are interested in you, but not now. How long under such conditions the potential candidate countries will retain an interest in EU membership - I do not know.
I think that over time the difference between full membership and associated status will gradually be leveled out. Even now there are quite significant differences within the EU itself - the eurozone, the Schengen Agreement, and the labor market of the old EU, which, with the exception of three countries, is closed to new members until 2011. In the future, the line between full members who will remain in a transitional phase for a very long time (for example, Romania) and associated members will gradually blur. Associated membership, at least for a time, could become Europe's answer. Because, on the one hand, Europe will show its interest in these countries, and on the other, it will expand more slowly and more deliberately.
All this means that full membership itself will become much more amorphous - there will be full members with full rights, full members with limited rights, associated members, and so on. The future belongs to a motley Europe.