A U.S. Transportation Security Administration officer checks baby bottles at Atlanta airport.
In 2006, the United States introduced a similar aviation ban—after an attempt to blow up several transatlantic flights using 'liquid bombs.' However, Washington ultimately decided that it would not be possible to protect passengers this way. Lenta.ru interviewed foreign security experts and found that they hold fundamentally different views on the threat posed by liquids on board an aircraft.
The Federal Air Transport Agency has extremely tightened the rules for carry-on luggage. In accordance with the published directive of Rosaviatsiya, 'when passing through pre-flight screening, any liquids and personal hygiene items that a passenger has on their person or in their carry-on luggage are recommended to be checked in.' As an exception, passengers will be allowed to take with them medications that they require on a regular basis, as well as 'items and means of personal hygiene that ensure the vital functions of passengers during the flight,' but only 'after their identification by the airport aviation security services and passing a security check using technical means of inspection and detection of explosives.'
Rosaviatsiya cited the ongoing 'threat of terrorist acts using improvised explosive devices' as the reason for tightening security measures. The federal agency does not claim that this threat has increased, but acknowledges that aircraft are the most vulnerable targets for terrorists because 'they bear the state registration and identification marks of the Russian Federation on their sides.' In this way, attackers can cause damage 'not only to individual citizens or organizations, but to the entire state,' Rosaviatsiya believes.
The tightening of baggage rules nationwide was announced two days after Moscow's Sheremetyevo and Vnukovo airports banned the carriage of liquids on board (the third Moscow hub, Domodedovo, which primarily serves international destinations, did not support them). The terminal buildings announced the ban in connection with the upcoming Sochi Olympics. It was reported that it would be in effect until March 21, 2014. The duration of the tightenings imposed by Rosaviatsiya is unknown.
There is also no information on which medications and personal hygiene items are considered 'necessary.' The state television channel Vesti, for example, suggested that 'medicine will be allowed to be kept in carry-on luggage only if you have a certificate that it is vital during the flight.' This issue has already alarmed the State Duma: the head of the committee on public associations, Yaroslav Nilov (LDPR faction), requested clarifications of the new rules from the head of Rosaviatsiya, Alexander Neradko. 'At the moment, the general wording of the directive allows for a broad interpretation,' RIA Novosti quotes the deputy.
Transport Minister Maxim Sokolov on Thursday clarified the provisions of his agency: liquid medications will be opened by security personnel. If a medication cannot be opened, 'you will either have to refuse to fly or choose another mode of transport,' he said. And on Friday, Sokolov gave airports 24 hours to implement the new rules.
Combating the liquid threat
The ban on freely carrying liquids in carry-on luggage in most countries was introduced after the British government uncovered a plot by Al-Qaeda to blow up ten 'liquid bombs' based on acetone peroxide and hexamine peroxide on board transatlantic flights. The possibility of carrying carry-on luggage in the UK was reduced to a minimum—initially, passengers could only take documents and a wallet on board, pre-packed in clear plastic bags.
The ultra-strict carry-on luggage rules were liberalized in the UK in that same 2006; in other countries, the ban on transporting items in the cabin, if it was in effect, lasted only a few days. Meanwhile, the requirement to carry liquids in a separate clear plastic bag containing containers of no more than 100 milliliters each became established in global practice. However, from January 31, 2014, European countries will begin to gradually lift these restrictions as well.
'The best defense against terrorism (...) is invisible: it is investigations, intelligence gathering, and response in case of an immediate threat,' American security expert Bruce Schneier argued in December 2009. That was when the last terrorist incident in the air occurred in the United States: Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to blow up a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. He used a metal-free explosive device made from pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), which would detonate upon contact with acid. The bomb, which Abdulmutallab carried in his underwear, did not explode, and the hapless terrorist, who suffered severe burns, was subdued by passengers.
Similar devices were found in October 2010 on two cargo planes traveling to the United States from the UK and the UAE. The deadly packages were intercepted thanks to Saudi intelligence. However, Bruce Schneier asserts that the U.S. authorities preferred 'security theater designed to protect against cinematic threats' over active preventive intelligence work, i.e., measures that most visually demonstrate to citizens that the state cares about their safety. Schneier calls the ban on transporting liquids on board aircraft and thorough personal screening at boarding elements of this theater.
Schneier's main conclusion is that just as generals prepare for the previous war, authorities respond to terrorist challenges by increasing security at those facilities that have previously been attacked. As if confirming this, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, after the 'underwear bomb' incident, ordered airport security to conduct mandatory personal searches, paying special attention to the groin and torso areas, checking all passenger belongings without exception, and on board, flight attendants were to ensure that one hour before landing all passengers remained in their seats and had no access to carry-on luggage.
Similar security measures were introduced in many European countries. Despite this, just four days after Abdulmutallab's failed attack, British reporter Stuart Clarke managed to bring a syringe on board a flight from Amsterdam to London, which he kept in his jacket pocket throughout the entire screening. Soon, restrictions on using the toilet and accessing carry-on luggage were lifted.
Schneier's logic can easily be applied to terrorists as well. They may have easier targets, but hijacking or blowing up a plane is a 'sensational crime that the media will turn into a spectacle,' and terrorists 'seek publicity and the opportunity to attract the attention of the government or society,' says Sergei Shelukhin, professor of criminology at John Jay College in New York, in an interview with Lenta.ru.
'That attracts them [terrorists], and I don't know why we haven't seen even more attacks on planes. Obviously, it's not that difficult to do. The shoe bomber (in 2001 on a Paris-Miami flight, Islamist Richard Reid unsuccessfully tried to detonate an explosive device hidden in his shoe – note by Lenta.ru) or the underwear bomber [Abdulmutallab] simply didn't use the right technique,' shares Douglas Laird, former head of security for the American airline Northwest Airlines.
To be continued.
Alexander ARTEMIEV.
lenta.ru