Most armed conflicts occur in two regions - Africa and the Middle East
According to estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, there were 14 large-scale armed conflicts in the world in 2008. For comparison, in 1990 there were 32, after which a process of reduction began. This process was uneven: in 2002 and 2004 there was a sharp improvement, but in 2005 the number of wars increased again.
Meanwhile, according to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 345 political conflicts were recorded worldwide in 2008, 39 of which escalated to a military stage, including nine 'full-scale' wars. Additionally, in 95 cases conflicts entered a stage of sporadic violence, meaning there were battles and bloodshed, but the number of casualties was relatively small. Compared to 2007, the situation worsened significantly - in particular because that year, a military stage was observed in 32 conflicts. The International Institute for Strategic Studies counted 16 conflicts in 2008, some of which have lasted for decades.
Over the past decades, most armed conflicts have occurred in two regions - Africa and the Middle East. According to calculations by specialists at Troy University, 160 countries in the world are considered 'developing,' and 54 of them experience conflicts of varying intensity that could potentially escalate into a large-scale phase.
It is still unclear when and for what reasons an internal conflict may transition from a 'cold' to a 'hot' phase. For a long time, the main culprit of civil wars was said to be the difference in income levels of the conflicting parties (for example, ethnic majority and minority, residents of 'poor' and 'rich' regions of a country, authorities and oppositionists, etc.). The idea that poverty increases the risk of conflict is accepted by economists worldwide almost unconditionally. Nevertheless, no clear link between poverty and civil wars has been established.
Some studies have shown that if a state is weak, i.e., does not have sufficiently powerful financial, administrative, legal, and military leverage, which in turn is related to the country's income level, rebels have a better chance of success if a conflict begins. It is precisely the hope of state weakness and unpreparedness that in many cases inspires rebels to carry out violent actions. Another risk factor is considered to be the lack of unity in a given society: if power belongs to representatives of only one or two ethnic or religious groups, and the rest of society has no chance to change the status quo, then there is a high probability that their discontent will turn into an armed struggle.
Daron Acemoglu from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Simon Johnson from the National Bureau of Economic Research, and James Robinson from Harvard University, in their study 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development,' made an interesting conclusion: stability in African countries depends on which state colonized them. In countries that were once British possessions, civil wars occurred much less frequently than in former French colonies. The authors explain this paradox as follows: in countries using the English common law system, private property is much better protected than in states whose legal foundation is the 'Napoleonic Code.' Another factor was ecological: in colonies where the average life expectancy was traditionally low, Europeans rarely settled, and consequently they did not establish a corresponding legal system on African soil. The result was a vacuum that subsequently led to bloody civil conflicts.
World Bank economists Simeon Djankov and Marta Reynal-Querol, in their book 'The Causes of Civil Wars,' put forward their own version. The authors analyzed 211 countries worldwide, 113 of which are former colonies. From 1965 to 2005, civil wars or other large-scale internal conflicts occurred in 94 countries (only 22 of these states had no colonial past). According to their logic, the main causes of civil wars are insecurity of property rights and an inadequate law enforcement system. That is, the risk of an armed conflict depends on the 'quality' of state institutions. The impartiality and honesty of law enforcement agencies and courts are the key to peaceful coexistence of citizens, while the level of poverty and income of the population are only of secondary importance.
Economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, in their study 'Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars,' show that the presence of rich natural resources in a country increases the risk of armed conflicts. Natural resources can be used by rebels to finance military operations, and in case of victory over the government, they are the main prize. The less developed a country's economy and the less diversified it is, the greater the chance that a civil war will start. For countries with one or two main resources used as their primary export (e.g., oil or cocoa), the probability of facing a civil war problem is five times higher than for diversified economies.
Researchers from Stanford University James Fearon and David Laitin concluded that, all else being equal, a larger population in a country increases the chances of the onset of civil war. Their line of reasoning is as follows: in order to gain control of an economic base, insurgents only need to ensure control over part of the territory - levies from the local population will allow them to maintain rebel armies. Moreover, states traditionally find it more difficult to control a large population, which creates additional opportunities for anti-government activities.
In turn, Francesco Caselli and Wilbur Coleman from Duke University put forward the following hypothesis: if an ethnic majority is in power, that majority may be tempted to militarize society in order to control and subjugate national minorities. The higher the risk of civil wars, the better prepared the state must be to suppress rebellions in the country; consequently, countries where there is one large ethnic group and several small ones constantly slide into militarization. Conversely, if there is no dominant people in the country and the population consists of several roughly equal ethnic groups, there are fewer reasons for the militarization of society and fewer threats to the country's security.
As a rule, conflicts do not erupt suddenly - in the vast majority of cases, war is preceded by a long-term deterioration of the crisis situation, which under certain circumstances can escalate into a military phase. On the other hand, in recent decades, the international community has accumulated vast experience in preventing and mitigating armed conflicts. However, the effectiveness of their actions is low. For example, in 2008 alone, UN bodies organized 20 peacekeeping missions in various countries around the world suffering from armed violence. According to estimates from the University of Notre Dame, in 2008, international mediators of various kinds participated in the process of settling about 77 conflicts of varying intensity; in total, with their help, 52 peace agreements were signed, half of which were not implemented even at the initial stage.
In 2008, the UN was involved in one way or another in settling 20 conflicts, including in 17 cases peacekeeping operations or peace support operations were conducted. None of the attempts by the most influential international organization to resolve disputes between warring parties were successful. Some UN peacekeeping missions have been ongoing since the late 1940s (for example, the 'partition' of India and Pakistan began in 1949), but only in rare cases have these operations contributed to the final resolution of the conflict.
Karl DeRouen and Uk Heo, authors of the book 'Civil Wars of the World', note that internal conflicts are extremely rarely resolved definitively. Conflicts have a tendency to 'mutate' and manifest themselves in a new quality. For example, in 1978-1979 in Nicaragua, the 'leftist' Sandinistas fought dictator Somoza, and in 1982-1988, former Somoza supporters - the 'contras' - launched a guerrilla war against the victorious Sandinistas. Rwanda experienced three periods of civil wars: 1956-1954, 1990-1992, and the 1994 genocide.
According to estimates by Peter Wallensteen, who heads the analytical project Uppsala Conflict Data Program - a database that accumulates information on armed conflicts in the world - after the end of the Cold War, the number of internal conflicts increased sharply in the world. This, according to Wallensteen, means that many of the tools available to the international community are not very suitable for resolving internal conflicts. The fact is that foreign peacekeepers face a fundamental diplomatic problem: on the one hand, they must respect state sovereignty, and at the same time, somehow find ways to support peaceful settlement within independent states.
Based on materials from Washington ProFile.