Meanwhile, Russian legislators are preparing a document that will open the possibility of incorporating new territories into the country. About what will happen to Crimea and its inhabitants in the near future, Lenta.ru spoke with conflict resolution expert Natalia Mirimanova.
Natalia Mirimanova is an expert and practitioner in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. She has worked for more than 20 years in various regions of Russia, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Moldova, and the countries of the former Yugoslavia; she has collaborated with the UN, OSCE, International Alert, and other global organizations. In recent years, Mirimanova has studied the situation in Ukraine and Crimea – she is co-director of the project "Crimean Political Dialogue." Natalia Mirimanova calls herself a person who stands "between the sides."
In an interview with Lenta.ru, Mirimanova stated that in Crimea over the past 20 years there have been many quarrels between Tatars and "Slavs," but they have never led to acute conflicts. Mirimanova, who clearly sympathizes with the pro-Russian prime minister of the autonomy, Sergei Aksyonov, links the deterioration of the situation exclusively to Russian intervention. In her opinion, the division of society cemented by the referendum will be "a bad start for a new life": the opponents of the referendum will most likely not leave; and if they are forced to leave the republic, this would have to be considered an ethnic and political "cleansing." Be that as it may, Mirimanova concludes, the main thing now is to prevent war.
– In your opinion, what makes the current situation in Crimea dangerous?
– In the analysis of the political situation in Crimea, geopolitical categories prevail. But since I know the situation quite well from the inside, that is, at the Crimean level, it would probably be important to talk about that. First of all, the current crisis in Crimea is inspired from outside. The most radical role in this, of course, was played by Russia with its saber rattling and actual presence in Crimea, in contrast to the mythical invasion of the so-called "Banderites," who never made it to Crimea. I generally doubt that they were planning to go there.
For Crimea, this conflict situation is quite uncharacteristic: Crimea is a sleepy, calm society. There have been many crises there over the past 20 years – most of them were related to the confrontation between the Crimean Tatars and, conditionally speaking, Slavs. There is such a term in Crimea – "Slavs." It is used to refer to those who are not Crimean Tatars, even Greeks and Armenians. So, all conflicts between the local population occurred over very specific issues – business, land. Everything was always resolved very quickly, calmly, without casualties. Crimea, like all of Ukraine as a whole, is a culture of compromise. Perhaps not always transparent, with some behind-the-scenes agreements, but the value of maintaining calm and peace was always paramount. And in recent times, this political system of compromise has completely collapsed.
And we, for example, can trace the evolution of the referendum questions, which clearly show that there was external pressure involved. At first, the discussion was about expanding the status of autonomy, which, in fact, my Crimean colleagues of various stripes, and especially those from the Russian political sector, had spoken about before. Some held rallies, but these were small gatherings of people. Even the current prime minister, Sergei Aksyonov, whom I know well, positioned himself as a defender of the interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in Crimea – as part of Ukraine. That is, the discussion was always about expanding rights and powers, about turning into a real autonomy, but it cannot be said that Kyiv and Simferopol actively worked on this topic. The way the wording of the question changed so rapidly shows that this is no longer a Crimean format.
– You said that you personally know Sergei Aksyonov. There are all sorts of rumors about him, but what can you say about him?
– I know Sergei as the leader of the party "Russian Unity," which received only three percent in the last elections. This is one of the very small Russian parties in Crimea – some of them have never even been parliamentary. With Aksyonov and several other parliamentarians from different factions, we were in South Tyrol, Alto Adige – an autonomous province in Italy, a disputed territory between Austria and Italy. We went there to see how this autonomy lives, this was in November 2012. Sergei seemed to me a practical and very businesslike person. Aksyonov's main task was to bring something to Crimea, some experience, and practical experience – he looked at how waste processing is arranged in the Italian autonomy, how their apple orchard economy develops, and so on.
He seemed to me a person focused on developing the real living conditions of the people who are his electorate. In this case, Russians. Here I must say that a significant event occurred on February 26, when Russians and Tatars literally clashed face to face in the courtyard of the Crimean parliament. And then Sergei Aksyonov as the leader of the Russian community and Refat Chubarov as the leader of the Crimean Tatar community separated these people almost physically. These two people separated the people – and went to negotiate. And at that moment I thought: after all, the Crimean scheme works. And then events began to develop not according to the Crimean scheme: the next day the parliament building was seized by armed people, and the parliament began making decisions without the presence of some parliamentarians and the media. The Crimean methods of conflict resolution ended.
– Do you assume that the ban on entry for Ukrainian journalists and international observers to Crimea is inspired by the Russian authorities – and Aksyonov has nothing to do with it?
– Of course, this is inspired by Russia, I have no doubt about that. I do not know the role that the current Crimean authorities play, but the fact that they are not entirely independent is obvious.
– What evidence can you provide?
– It’s very difficult with evidence here. As you can see, there is a lot of information on the internet. I always check and recheck information, watch English and French news, call people, and I have firsthand information.
– If it’s not a secret, who are these people?
– Very different people. Of course, not top officials, but they are well informed about the situation and, in fact, live there. They go outside and see what’s happening. Colleagues from the Russian political sector say that the Russian military in Crimea are only those assigned to bases under the treaty. Their opponents, as well as English and French media, reported 15,000 troops in addition to those at bases. In any case, the fact that armed men in uniform without insignia, recognizable as Russians, are walking around Crimea rather than staying on bases, violates the treaty between Russia and Ukraine…
– Excuse me, but if you know Sergei Aksyonov well, why don’t you call him and find out what’s happening in Crimea, why journalists are not allowed in, and who allows Russian troops to move freely across the territory?
– Right now, unfortunately, everything is at a level where we have to think about how not to harm anyone, because bloodshed in Crimea cannot be ruled out. If I were sure that everything happening is a Crimean scheme, I would know how to act.
– But are you sure that everything happening in Crimea is a Russian scheme?
– Yes. Until very recently, there was no talk of Crimea leaving Ukraine. The same chairman of the Crimean parliament and all deputies always emphasized that the discussion was only about autonomy within Ukraine. I understand that political preferences change, views evolve. But such a rapid development of events leads me—and not only me—to think that there was external influence. Moreover, I know that the Crimean parliament received a proposal from Moscow and some guarantees. And, of course, I regard the Federation Council’s decision to deploy troops as a factor of external interference and pressure.
Look for yourself: in 2004, “Banderite Yushchenko” came to power, let’s call him that. And nothing, no movements to protect the Russian population in Crimea occurred. No talk of secession, of Crimea breaking away—despite the change of power and the presence of both nationalists and internationalists in government. I understand that the Kiev events and the associated paraphernalia—“Right Sector,” Oleh Tyahnybok, who said he would liquidate Crimea’s autonomy (but who took his statements seriously with ten percent support?)—affected the opinion of Russian people in Crimea, actualizing their fears.
At the same time, media technologies worked on their perception of reality: the majority of the Russian population watches Russian TV channels, and Ukrainian channels are now completely blocked in Crimea. Russian television constantly talks about the dangers awaiting the Russian-speaking population in Crimea if “Banderites” gain access to Crimea—a collective image of everything terrible, and speaking Ukrainian at that.
But I must tell you that according to all the most recent sociological surveys, the percentage of Crimeans who theoretically wanted Crimea to join Russia never reached 40%.
The decision to annex Crimea to Russia—and no one now doubts the outcome of the referendum, alas—will never be recognized by Kiev or the international community. This means that a legal vacuum will arise, which could be filled in various ways. Sanctions against Moscow are inevitable, because there is not a single real argument for the deployment of troops: “Banderites” in Crimea are as mythical as nuclear facilities in Iraq.
Not a single Russian has been killed in Crimea, not a single Russian school closed. The situation here is even more complicated in some ways than in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for which Russia also suffered reputational losses. But there was a war there. Any discrimination against Russians in Crimea is completely absent—there are six Ukrainian schools and 600 Russian ones. I recently conducted a study for the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities on the representation of previously deported peoples—Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Armenians—in government bodies.
Since there is no ethnic statistics in Ukraine, I counted everything manually by surnames and stand by every figure. So, in all of Crimea, there is one district head who is a Crimean Tatar, one city mayor who is a Crimean Tatar, and all the rest are “Slavs,” the vast majority from the Party of Regions. In courts and the prosecutor’s office, 90% of the staff are Russian.
– So, in your opinion, what is dangerous about the referendum?
– A referendum as such is not dangerous; it is a normal democratic form. But referendums on such serious issues are held after long years of consultations and negotiations—with the center, internally, with various groups, creating all sorts of safety nets in case of separation and in case of non-separation. In Crimea, the situation is as far from that as possible and fraught with bloodshed and conflict. Moreover, dividing society roughly in half is a serious split, and one cannot simply hope that opponents of the referendum will accept it and leave. And if they are forced to leave Crimea, it will be called a “purge,” ethnic and political. A bad start for a new life.
– Who, in your opinion, can prevent this conflict?
– Only one person in the Kremlin.
Interviewed by Svetlana REITER,
Lenta.ru